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Abstract
This paper explores the factors affecting market liquidity using a simulation model of an artificial
market. We first survey definition of market liquidity and discuss the relationship between market
liquidity and market efficiency or stability. We then consider a continuous auction market and discuss
factors affecting market liquidity. Incorporating the discussion, we construct an artificial market model
and conduct various simulations. We find that an increase in the ratio of market participants following
short-term market price movements results in an increase in the number of trades and at the same time
a decrease in the volume of accumulated order flows. When market participants become more
risk-averse on average, market liquidity decreases. A precipitous decrease in market liquidity results
when market participants lose confidence in their expectations on future prices. Changes in the
sensitivities of traders to market information affect market liquidity, but various market liquidity
indicators do not necessarily move in the same direction. These results suggest that change in market
liquidity indicators may not always be consistent.
* Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Japan, the Committee on
the Global Financial System, or the Bank for International Settlements.1
1. Introduction
In this paper we review the factors which affect market liquidity and present a framework which
measures such effects quantitatively. This framework enables us to clarify the logic behind recent
market reforms and the introduction of rules (e.g. the introduction of electronic trading,
1 the
development of disclosure of trade information for market participants,
2 and the prevalence of
computerised bilateral transactions).
3 Market liquidity has long been implicitly assumed to exist when
market participants evaluate the prices of financial products and manage their portfolios and when
central banks implement monetary policy. Since the cost of losing market liquidity is large despite its
implicit nature, the improvement and stability of market liquidity is not only important for market
participants, but also serves as a way to enhance financial market stability.
This paper is composed of two major parts: a survey of the concepts relating to the factors which
affect market liquidity and verification by simulation. In the conceptual summary part, we first
summarise the definition of market liquidity and the relationship between market liquidity and market
efficiency or stability. Based on the summary, we consider the price discovery mechanism, in which
potential trade needs are actually realised in the market as order flows and prices are discovered by
matching such orders, and we clarify our direction toward simulation model construction. In the
simulation, we assume a certain market structure and focus on the parameters which affect an
individual market participant’s ordering decision, such as expectation of the asset price, confidence in
such expectation, the extent of risk aversion, sensitivity to various kinds of market information. These
parameters determine the realisation process of potential trade needs of market participants according
to the market structure. Therefore, through the simulation we observe, as a mechanism in which
market structure affects the state of market liquidity, how the above parameters affect market
behaviour. Recently, simulation techniques have been widely used in the area of economics, and are
useful in analysing an economic mechanism, which is an aggregate of complex individual behaviours.
In our analysis, we do not deal with actual markets which trade specific goods such as foreign
exchange, stocks, or government bonds, but assume a market in which hypothetical assets or securities
are traded. Although some studies have dealt with the foreign exchange market
4 or analyses of
government bond markets,
5 many studies have focused mainly on the New York Stock Exchange.
6 In
our analysis, instead of recognising the difference between markets by the character of the goods
traded, we regard the difference as a difference of market microstructure or trading rules, and try to
capture their general effects on market liquidity.
The composition of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines market liquidity and Section 3 reviews
the concepts relating to the mechanism of determining market liquidity. Section  4 will present a
framework for both our model and the simulations, and we conduct the simulation analysis in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes by describing some implications and areas for future research.
1 The Tokyo Stock Exchange has shifted to system trading since March 1998. The Osaka Stock Exchange has shifted from
the open out-cry system to the electronic trading system since December 1998.
2 As a part of the equity market reform efforts, the Tokyo Stock Exchange started the provision of order volume at the best
bid and ask prices from November 1998.
3 In the U.S., a bilateral transactions market for institutional investors using computerised trading networks such as the
POSIT system have been developing rapidly. Daily turnover has increased more than 50 times in the 10 years since 1987,
and the market has become known as the ‘fourth market’ after the stock exchange, over-the-counter (OTC) transactions,
and OTC transactions for exchange stocks.
4 Lyons (1992, 1995).
5 Fleming and Remolona (1999), Proudman (1995)
6 Because of the trading concentration on the exchange and its simple structure, which consists of one specialist for each
individual issue.2
2. Definition of market liquidity
2.1 Definition of market liquidity
Market liquidity has been defined in various ways according to the context in which it has been used.
In retrospect, we can see that Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1962) chose “market liquidity” as a subject in
economics, but the terminology they used consisted of phrases such as the “future volatility of market
prices” or the “possibility of immediate execution of a transaction.” When discussing whether or not a
market is liquid, Bagehot (1971) focused on factors such as the existence of adverse selection effects
due to information asymmetry, the price impact of a trade, and the portion of trading cost which is set
according to the pricing policy of the market maker.
7 When market liquidity is discussed in market
microstructure theory, it is often the case that more practical concepts are introduced, such as the “cost
of changing positions (tightness),” the “trade size or thickness of the order book-profile (order book
refers to a panel which provides traders with bid-ask prices and volume offered per price) required for
changing prices (market depth),” and the “required period of time to recover from price fluctuation
caused by a sudden shock or to reach a new equilibrium (market resiliency).”
8 In defining the “liquid
market” of finance theory, which is a premise for the option equation to hold, Black (1971) noted that
this is a market in which a “bid-ask price is always quoted, its spread is small enough, and small trades
can be immediately executed with minimal effect on price.” Grossman and Miller (1988) pointed out
that we can measure the liquidity of a market by looking “the ability of executing trades under the
current price quotes price– and time-wise.”
We define a liquid market as a market where a large volume of trades can be immediately executed
with minimum effect on price. In other words, the liquidity of the market can be recognised by how
low the uncertainties of execution price are. In addition, we consider “market depth,” which absorbs
the price changes accompanied by trade execution, as an important factor in explaining market
liquidity. In determining “market depth,” we need to take into account the size of the trade needs,
including potential needs, of a certain asset.
9
Market liquidity is an important factor which affects market efficiency. Given that market liquidity is
an indicator which represents market depth and shows the absorption power of risk premium on
trading execution, the condition of market liquidity can be considered as one of the factors affecting
the price discovery function. When we consider market efficiency in the context of a market’s price
discovery function and the information content of price,
10 market liquidity can be regarded as a factor
which affects market price uncertainties – uncertainties in the sense that market prices do not reveal all
available information or in the sense that market price will temporarily diverge from the
market-clearing equilibrium price – or price discovery function, and will, as a result, affect market
efficiency.
11 We can improve market efficiency by increasing market liquidity. Specifically, a decline
of market price uncertainties accompanied by an increase in market liquidity will, through the decline
of liquidity premiums such as the bid-ask spread and market impact, improve market efficiency,
resulting in efficient fund and risk allocation. If one can clarify the mechanism by which market
7 The cost refers to a part of bid-ask spread set by the market maker to compensate a fixed trading cost. This is equivalent
to the implicit cost (c ~ ) illustrated in Section 3.
8 Kyle (1985), Harris (1990).
9 Fukao (1988) pointed out that an increase of market depth during the rapid internationalisation in the 1980s contributed
to the declining trend of the risk premium related to foreign exchange transactions. During this development process, the
“size of the asset which can be mobilised in the market” will affect to what extent the changing pressures on foreign
exchange, caused by transactions such as portfolio shifts, can be absorbed.
10 For a discussion of the definition of market efficiency, see Brown and Jennings (1989).
11 For studies which review market efficiency and market liquidity from the viewpoint of the uncertainties of transaction
execution price and information reflecting process on price, see Brown and Zhang (1997), Easley and O’Hara (1992).3
liquidity affects the price discovery process, it will provide a good reference in considering measures
designed to improve market efficiency.
Market liquidity is an important issue in maintaining financial system stability. The collapse of a
system, or the emergence of systemic risk, will be caused by the market coming to a halt or by the loss
of market participants’ faith in the market price discovery function. As tautological as it may sound, a
halt in the endogenous market price discovery function depends on whether or not market participants
who try to avoid the risk of market halt form a majority. Behaviour to avoid the risk of market halt
such as the reduction of market exposure by closing positions is considered to materialise when
market conditions including price levels and the speed of changes in the price level have exceeded
specified limit values, and there will be various processes by which the system collapses. The
processes include feedback effects caused by market participants’ responses and the synchronising
effect between markets. Such boundary and collapse processes may differ between markets. The
characteristics of boundary and collapse processes depend on market participants’ expectations of or
confidence in the market itself, which are generated from market behaviour under normal conditions
including a small degree of stress. Therefore, the maintenance of sufficient liquidity under normal
conditions will autonomously improve market stability by expanding the market boundaries and
improving the participants’ confidence in market sustainability.
2.2 Static and dynamic aspects of market liquidity
Traditional measures of market liquidity include trade volume, or the number of trades, although the
above definition of market liquidity suggests that any indicator which represents the extent of
“uncertainty of trade execution price” would be an appropriate measure of market liquidity.
Specifically, such indicators include the bid-ask spread, which is determined by taking into account
the premium against price uncertainties, changes in bid-ask price at the moment of trade executions
(market impact), and the period of time required to reach a new equilibrium after trade executions
(market resiliency). In a market with no bid-ask spread or market impact, and quite a large market
resiliency, the trade execution price will be identical to the market price at the time of trading, and
there the market participants need not worry about price uncertainties in the execution of trades. Such
a market is regarded as quite deep and highly liquid.
Past studies of market liquidity have mainly focused on static aspects and have adopted indicators
which show static market depth, such as turnover, bid-ask spread, as measures of market liquidity.
12
However, in order to examine how market liquidity affects the price discovery function in an actual
market, not only should the static aspects of market liquidity be examined, but also the dynamic. In
order to effectively capture supply and demand, we should take into account the dynamic
measurement of market liquidity. Effective supply and demand refers to each market participant’s
needs at a certain time which are not reflected in the observable order book-profile or order flows. The
reasons why effective supply and demand do not necessarily surface include the existence of explicit
trading costs such as taxes and transaction fees, and the uneven distribution of information among
market participants. Implicitly existing effective supply and demand are revealed through the
information about the price changes caused by trade execution itself, although there is another
mechanism by which a decline in trading costs and the prevalence of information induce new effective
supply and demand.
Just as one cannot judge the depth of a well by throwing a stone into it, but must wait until the sound
comes back, the potential depth of the market, i.e. effective supply and demand, is an indicator which
can only be recognised dynamically. We need to observe dynamic indicators such as price changes
12 Market observability was also an important factor in selecting such indicators for the sake of analysis.4
upon execution (market impact),
13 the speed of convergence from one trade price to the next
equilibrium price or bid-ask spread (market resiliency).
14 These dynamic indicators reflect the actual
results of the executed transaction and the process by which information derived from such results is
digested in the market. In discussing market liquidity under stress, it becomes essential to implement
analyses which incorporate such dynamic aspects. We outline conceptual ways to measure these
dynamic indicators in Appendix.
In this paper, we focus on the following indicators to explore market liquidity conditions: probability
of quote existence, trade frequency, price volatility, bid-ask spread, gross order book volume (buying
order volume plus selling order volume), and net order book volume (buying order volume minus
selling order volume). We also calculate the volatility of gross order book volume, and this indicator
can be regarded as representing the ease with which the order book is restored to its original state after
certain decrease in orders, that is, a proxy of market resiliency. The standard deviation of net order
book volume represents bias of the market supply-demand. When the value increases, this suggests
that large supply-demand bias is more likely to occur.
3. Conceptual summary of the mechanism through which market
microstructure affects market liquidity
One of the purposes of this study is to clarify conceptually the process by which actual market
microstructure affects market liquidity. The process by which market microstructure affects price
discovery in a market and market liquidity via changes in market participants’ behaviours is composed
of two stages: (1) from when market participants hold potential trade needs based on their individual
reasons to when they actually decide to place orders in the market (the micro stage), and (2) the stage
in which such orders are accumulated in the market and trades are executed (the macro stage). In the
following, we will summarise the mechanism through which market microstructure affects
decision-making at the micro stage and price discovery at the macro stage.
13 Among security traders and researchers, market impact is often used as a term which also includes market resiliency,
although this paper differentiates between the two, since we emphasise the different dynamic generation mechanisms of
the two indicators.
14 Engle and Lange (1997).5
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3.1 Decision-making process of market participants at the micro stage
There are various channels through which traders’ decision-making processes are influenced by the
market microstructure.
15 If there is some institution or set of rules, such as an accounting rule and a tax
system, which induce certain effects on the decision-making process of entering the market and
placing trade orders, the market microstructure will alter effective supply and demand in the market
and finally affect market liquidity.
First of all, we consider the mechanism by which an economic agent decides to participate in a
transaction in a specific market. Under certain budget constraints, the economic agent will decide to
trade the goods. Such a decision to trade is based on his/her judgement that by executing the trade
he/she will maximise his/her net benefit under his/her own budget constraint upon comparison of
alternative behaviours.
16 Three factors which affect the decision-making at this point are the budget
constraint of the economic agent (B ), behavioural alternatives (i), and the expected returns and costs,


















15 For example, differences between asset value based on an accounting rule and economic value will change the optimal
trade price, which is the benchmark when market participants wish to trade, and thus may, as a result, affect the price
discovery process. Regulations concerning investor’s trading behaviour and tax systems have similar effects. In addition,
when some market participants in the stock market have private information on individual stock prices, market
expectations about future stock prices may vary because of such information asymmetry.
16 To state this more practically, when an investor tries to decide whether or not to trade in a specific market, the investor
will, regardless of whether he explicitly calculates or not, compare the costs and benefits of executing the trade with that
of other economic activities – trading in the futures market instead of the cash market, trading different issues, and
trading stocks instead of corporate bonds, etc. –, and make a decision that by executing the trade he is considering he will
maximise his net benefit under his own budget constraint.6
It is worth noting that there are numerous potential trade needs behind the actual trade orders explicitly
placed in the market, and that whether such potential need are realised or not is determined not
discontinuously but by the continuous cost-benefit function noted above. Therefore, in examining the
issue of market liquidity, not only should the orders explicitly placed in the market be considered, but
also the underlying trade needs, that is, effective supply and demand.
Next we will consider how to quantify such costs and benefits. Cost components include: (1) the
explicit trading cost  e c , such as brokerage fee and tax, and (2) the implicit trading cost c ~ , which is
the difference between optimal trade price and actual execution price (expected price at the moment of
decision-making).
17 Other than brokerage fee and tax, explicit trading cost includes all kinds of cost
imposed on those who trade in the market.
18
c c C e
~ + =
Implicit trading cost refers to the difference between the optimal trade price ( o P ) and the expected
value of the execution price (
~
P e ). The optimal trading price  o P  will be recognised in conjunction with
the trade volume ( o v ), and in general the execution price  e P
~
 is a function of ve (the expected value of
the execution volume). In determining the relationship between  e P
~
 and ve,
19 the depth of the market
should be taken into account and thus the relation will be affected by market liquidity expectations.
o o e e v P v P c - = ~ ~ ~
Among the determinants of implicit trading cost, optimal trade price P o will be determined by a
trader’s expectations concerning future prices and by institutional needs. In forming the expectation, a
trader’s individual strategy for trading, for example chartist or fundamentalist, will have an effect, and
in the case of informed traders, private information about future price changes will also be
incorporated into the process. Institutional needs will reflect factors including preference among assets
caused by accounting rules and the effects of investment regulations.
The expected value of the actual execution price ( e P
~
), another factor which determines the implicit
trading cost, will be affected substantially, in the short run, by the market structure and trading rules,
and, as in the case of the optimal trade price  o P , partially by an individual trader’s expectation of
future price changes. For example, when we look at how implicit trading costs are determined in the
Tokyo Stock Exchange system, traders will conjecture the  e P
~
 for the two alternatives – market order
and limit order – and select the one with lower cost. In the case of market order,  e P
~
 is equal to the
17 This corresponds to the tracking error, which actual market participants such as fund managers use in evaluating their
execution performance ex post.
18 Premiums against the risks caused by the time difference among the markets or by the time lag between trade and
settlement based on the  n T +  rule in the securities market, and the development of hedging devices such as options and
futures, are also given costs which are unavoidable for market participants and thus can be regarded as factors which
affect the magnitude of trading costs in the market.
19 In order to focus our discussion on the core of the traders’ decision-making mechanism, we will attempt some
simplification. The relationship between price and quantity required for calculating the implicit cost can be classified into
two cases in which, under a limited budget constraint, liquidation of a certain quantity of goods has to be given priority
regardless of price, and in which selling at a certain price level has to be given priority regardless of quantity. If we
incorporate these concepts into the representative traders in market microstructure theory, the former is regarded as a
“liquidity trader” and the latter as an “informed trader.” For the former,  o v  is given and  o P  will be recognised as the
market price at each point of time. For the latter,  o P  is given and  o v  will be determined endogenously from the costs of
trading an amount of  e v  and the budget constraint, that is, traders will continue to trade as long as it is within their budget
constraint.7
current market price  t p  (best bid-ask).
20 On the other hand, when we consider  e P  in the case of limit
order, the ordered price itself  l p  as well as the opportunity cost q  for the lag between order and
execution should be taken into account.
 In calculating the opportunity cost, we need to incorporate
trader’s expectations concerning future price changes.
21 Expectations of future price changes will also
have an effect in calculating the optimal trade price  o P , and if we are to incorporate them into the
expected execution price  e P , it should be noted that the effects of future changes in supply and
demand of the market as a whole will also be incorporated. At this point, the availability of trade
information such as order book information will affect individual traders’ decision-making.
() q ± = l t e p p best P ,
~
() × best  here means that the lower price in case of a buying order and higher price in case of a selling
order will be selected.
With respect to the relationship between the difference in ordering methods and market liquidity, there
have been many theoretical studies which showed that the number of limit orders affects the extent of
market liquidity, or serves as an indicator of the state of market liquidity.
22 In those studies, limit
orders are treated as a component of market supply and demand, and as a source of information for
market makers. In addition, it was assumed that by observing limit orders, which are a type of option,
one can learn about market participants’ judgements of market liquidity, i.e. trading incentives.
20 It should be noted that the information contained in the quoted bid-ask price in a trading system in which market makers
exist is not necessarily the same as the best bid-ask price at the double auction system. The bid-ask price quoted by
market makers indirectly reveals the information obtained from the order flows they receive. For example, information
such as how many stop-loss orders are placed at a certain price level reflects the traders’ risk profiles or their expectations
of future price changes, and the quoted price itself reflects various complex pieces of information, including the market
maker’s own risk preference.
21 This suggests that even for traders who place the same limit selling order at the price of 100 yen when the market price is
98 yen, the opportunity cost for each trader may differ between the case in which he/she thinks that the current price will
rise immediately and the case in which he/she thinks the current price will remain constant for the time being.
22 Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981).8
If we are to summarise the decision-making process of an individual trader, it can be shown as
follows:
Decision-making mechanism Factors affecting the decision-making mechanism
()
C B







choosing the market and asset which maximises his/her net benefit from
economic activities
budget constraints
c c C e
~ + = e c : brokerage fee, tax, settlement rules, and hedging devices, etc.
o o e e v P v P c - = ~ ~ ~ o P : expectations regarding future prices, accounting rules, investment
regulations, etc.
relation between  e P
~
 and  e v ~ : expectations regarding future market liquidity
relationship between  o P  and  o v : liquidity trader, informed trader, etc.
() q ± = l t e p p best P ,
~
<market maker system>
t e p P =
~
q ± l p : limit order, expectations regarding future prices, expectations
regarding future demand and supply, etc.
t p market maker’s risk preference and information about stop-loss orders
3.2 Price discovery process at the macro stage
At the macro stage, a feedback mechanism will be generated: orders based on the decision-making
process at the micro stage are placed in the market, prices are determined by the execution of such
orders, and price information is in turn reflected in decision-making at the micro stage. There are some
studies which have dealt with the effects of different execution systems – for example, a double
auction system in which all orders are competitively matched or a market maker system in which
orders are concentrated in and executed at the market maker’s place – on market liquidity.
23 What is
important in any of these systems is how liquidity will be supplied to the market. During the process
of individual orders being accumulated and market price being discovered, in particular, the different
roles execution systems play in collecting and distributing information become quite important. Even
in the same system, for example, market liquidity can either increase or decrease depending on the
information distribution function of market makers.
When placing an order according to the execution system structure, the macro structure has already
been influenced by the micro decision-making. In addition, the information content incorporated at the
point of the market maker’s quote presentation may be summarised as part of the process of forming
macro information. What is important at the macro stage, therefore, is the mechanism by which
feedback of information about execution results and orders is provided by the execution system as an
input to market participant’s decision-making at the micro stage. The determinant of this mechanism is
the extent of information sharing in the market, that is, market transparency. In an extreme case, when
there are multiple market makers quoting independently in the market, there is no single common
price in the market. In addition, even if the market shares the same information about the execution
price, it may be the case that other information such as a market maker’s price quote at each point in
time is presented only to a fraction of the participants, or, in contrast, all order information is disclosed
23 Breedon and Holland (1997).9
as order book information. Furthermore, for effective supply and demand which are not explicitly
revealed to the market in the form of orders, information may be revealed as stop-loss orders.
The continuous double auction system and the market maker system are often deemed to be totally
different, although the main difference between the two systems stems from the difference in the
information collection and distribution mechanisms inherent in them. For example, the disappearance
of best bid or ask price in the double auction system, which we often observe in individual stock
markets, can be regarded as indicating the inadequacy of the information distribution function of the
system in revealing information about current market price. As summarised during the discussion of
the micro stage, what affects the decision-making process of an individual market participant is the
information about the current state and future changes of prices and supply and demand conditions of
the market obtained through the execution system. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the effects on the
price discovery process, the most important issue will be what kind of information collection and
distribution system the corresponding execution system employs, rather than the number of market
makers in the market. There are three key pieces of information required for market participants’
decision-making, shown as the three axes in Figure 2: (1) information about executed trades (trade
price, trade volume, etc.), (2) information about existing trade needs, (3) information about potential
trade needs (effective supply and demand). Points which are further away from the origin suggest
more sharing of information among market participants and an execution system will be illustrated as
a solid or dotted triangle, as shown in the Figure, corresponding to its information collection and
distribution mechanisms.









4. Framework of analysis
In order to verify the decision-making mechanism of market liquidity summarised in Section 3 and to
explore the possibility of quantitative analysis, we use a Monte Carlo simulation in our analysis. The
reason for using this procedure is that when an analytical approach is adopted, it often results in
solutions only being obtained in a relatively simple setting compared with that of actual market
conditions. Since market microstructure theory, on which our analysis is based, formulates an
individual trader’s behaviour at the micro level and aggregates the behaviour of many such traders to
analyse market behaviour, a simulation approach becomes quite useful. By using a Monte Carlo
simulation, which has developed rapidly in the field of finance theory, we can incorporate in our
models traders who have complex decision-making functions or conditions and analyse the market
behaviour patterns.10
Our model consists of two major parts. The first part models an individual trader’s decision-making
and ordering, corresponding to the micro stage explained in Section 3. The second part models order
flow aggregation in the trade execution system, which corresponds to the macro stage in Section 3.
Parameters incorporated in the model are those that are unique to each market participant, such as
(1) expected value of the asset, (2) confidence in the expected value, (3) the extent of risk aversion,
and (4) sensitivity to feedback information obtained from the macro stage. Based on these parameters,
a trader compares the benefit and cost (or risk) of each trade, selects a trade which maximises the net
benefit, and places an order if the net benefit is consistent with the extent of risk aversion. Of the
factors mentioned in Section 3 which affect trading behaviour, we assume explicit trading costs to be
zero. We employ a continuous auction system which allows market orders and limit orders (during
continuous sessions only) based on the trade execution model of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
24
4.1 Simulation flow
The structure of our model is as follows: in a TSE-type market composed of N  traders, we will
conduct a simulation for M  periods. In period t (t=1, 2, ···, M ), all N traders can place an order
once. Ordering rotation is randomly decided at each period, and each trader’s order will be executed
based on the first-in rule, as in the TSE. The flow of the simulation is summarised in Figure 3.
Figure 4 shows a rather detailed flow of the trader’s order decision process. Based on historical data
such as price, order-book, and indication, a trader will forecast future market price and market
liquidity (depth), take into account his/her own portfolio composition and risk preference, and make
decisions about the order (order/not order, limit order/market order, order volume, and order price in
the case of a limit order). All traders are uninformed about the true value of asset, and all market
behaviour can be regarded as endogenous.
25 With respect to the trader’s trading strategy, we have
prepared two types
26: (1) one that captures the trend of price changes and aims to gain a short-term
trading profit; and (2) one that conducts trading based on a long-term forecast of fundamentals and
mean convergence. Each trader alters his/her trading strategy according to the performance of
elements in the trading and market environment such as asset price and market depth.
The format for accumulating market data is outlined in Figure 5. In period t, trader i places an order,
the order is executed in the trade execution system, and market data will be produced as output:
market data forms a matrix of  N  rows and 8 columns. In columns 1-4, the number of the trader whose
limit/market order has been executed in the corresponding period (= period  i t ), the trade execution
price, the trade volume, and the timing of the order will be entered, while in columns 5-8, the trader
number whose limit order is remaining on the order book unexecuted, the buy/sell quote, the order
volume, and the timing of the order will be entered according to price (from high to low) and time
(first-in basis).
The input (initial conditions) and the output (results) of the simulation are summarised as in Figure 6.
24 In modelling a trade execution system, there are various methods, such as modelling a market maker system or modelling
a market with a plural execution system for one product. Since this paper focuses on the micro stage, i.e. how the market
microstructure affects an individual trader’s decision-making, we do not go as far as attempting various models of the
execution system.
25 When we analyse the effect of  an external shock in the simulation, we  change the initial conditions in the middle of the
simulation. For example, we place signals of future financial conditions (price, depth, price change ratio, etc.) which
traders normally forecast by using their own unique forecasting models. See Muranaga and Shimizu (1999) for the
details.
26 As for trading strategies, there is a variety which relates to the direction of trader’s forecasts such as momentum and
contrarian trading; and there is also a variety which relates to trading horizon. In order to differentiate traders who opt for
market order from those who opt for limit order, this paper has prepared two types of traders whose trading horizons
differ.11
Figure 3. Simulation flow
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In our simulation, we classify the variables which imply market conditions as invisible variables and
visible variables. The former cannot be observed in the actual market and include the trading patterns
of market participants, traders’ expected values, confidence in such values, and risk preferences. The
latter can be observed and include price indicators (market price, best-bid and best-ask prices), volume
indicators (trading volume and order book profile), and information about order attributes.
In the actual market, there is feedback by which current visible variables affect invisible variables
from the next period onward. In particular, when the market is heading toward a ‘critical’ situation,
decline in market liquidity, in addition to changes in price, will become an important factor
representing the dynamics of an endogenous trading halt and resumption. For example, decline in
market liquidity caused by a player’s exit from the market will induce an increase in transaction costs
which will encourage other players to exit, and may thus result in a halt of market functioning.
In the analysis, we observe the changes of market behaviour patterns brought about by altering the
combination of parameters such as the composition of traders and the dispersion of traders’ expected
values. Such analysis can be interpreted by observing what the effects would be when each trader’s
invisible variables, such as the extent of risk aversion, change by the modification of market
microstructure. In the actual market, market participants seem to change their behaviour based on
visible variables, that is to say, invisible variables change dynamically. In our analysis, however, we
provide constant figures for the invisible variables. And by analysing how changing patterns of visible
variables differ when the constant figures change, we consider the relationship between these two
groups of variables.
4.2 A trader’s decision-making model
For our trade execution model we employ a continuous auction system patterned after that of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). There is no designated liquidity provider and market liquidity is only
provided through trade orders from market participants. There are two types of traders in the market:
“value14
traders” who place limit orders based on their expected values, and “momentum traders” who make
market orders following short-term market trends.
27 The former maintain expected values of the asset
based on information other than market data, and place limit orders according to differences between
market prices and their expected values. The latter make market orders following short-term trends in
market prices, and, as a result, they buy when market prices are rising and sell when market prices are
falling.
28 In the following, we first look at the short-term price forecasting model, which both types of
traders use, and explain the trading behaviour patterns of both value traders and momentum traders.
4.2.1 Short-term price forecasting of the trader
In determining a trade order, a trader will make a short-term forecast of future market price based on
historical market data.
29 The simplest pattern is shown in Figure 7. At period t, a trader monitors price
movements during the period immediately before (b), measures the trend of mean price  h m  and
volatility  h s , and based on this data, forecasts the market price (expected value  ) E( f t P +  and variance
) Var( f t P+ ) of the next trading opportunity, which is a period of  f  ahead.
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In addition to the simplest pattern in which the trader refers only to historical price information, we
have also created a trader who considers volume information. Securities firms which are members of
the TSE can obtain order-book information on their computer monitors. We assume that traders will
incorporate such volume information in forming expectations of future market prices. Thus our model
focuses on two indicators which can be obtained from the order-book information. The first indicator
 
27 The traders in this paper are of the simplest type. Other than these two types, there is a variety of traders in the actual
market, such as ‘gamma traders’ who make delta hedges on their option positions, and ‘noise traders’ who have trading
incentives which are irrelevant to market movements. It should be noted that we are not at all suggesting that actual
traders can be neatly classified into the two types that we are using. Rather, it is reasonable to believe that the attributes
of value traders and momentum traders coexist within a single trader.
 
28 In the simulation, each trader’s order size is constant.
 
29 ‘Short-term’ refers to the interval between the point in time when the trader accesses the market to decide on a trade order
and the next trading opportunity.15
is gross order volume, which is the sum of limit orders for selling and buying, and can be interpreted
as a proxy of market depth. In general, the price risk caused by factors such as the impact of trading on
market price will increase as gross order volume decreases, and will decrease as gross order volume
increases. The second indicator is net order volume which shows the imbalance between limit orders
for selling and buying. When selling orders exceed buying orders, we can interpret this as downward
pressure on market prices, while buying orders exceeding selling orders can be interpreted as upward
pressure on market prices. Let  g V  be gross order volume (buying order volume plus selling order
volume),  n V  be net order volume (buying order volume minus selling order volume), and assume that
traders who consider volume information will modify the market price trend and volatility as follows:


















where  h m¢  and  h s¢  are obtained by revising the market price trend ( h m ) and volatility ( h s ) without
considering volume information. In addition,  g V  is the average of  g V  obtained by monitoring  g V  for
the period immediately before (b). By using this value as a benchmark, traders will relatively compare
the current and average state of market liquidity. a  and b  are positive constants.
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4.2.2 Trading behaviour of value traders
In addition to forecasting future short-term prices, value traders also maintain subjective information
P
~
 about the fundamental value of an asset. We assume that the expected values of all traders in the
market will, when aggregated, follow lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of  V s . Each
trader individually forms his/her expected value; its initial value is exogenously provided in our
simulation, although this initial value does not represent an asset’s true value. The value trader will
determine his/her order based on his/her expected value P
~
  and expectation distribution of the
short-term price  f t P + . In placing limit orders, the order price (selling:  ask P , buying:  bid P ) will be
established to allow for maximised expected return  ) E( ask P R  or  ) E( bid P R , which can be obtained
by multiplying return of the order and the probability of being executed within the interval [] f t t + ,
prior to the next ordering opportunity.
Selling limit order Maximum  )
~
( ) Pr( ) E( P P P P P R ask ask f t ask - × ³ = +
Buying limit order Maximum  )
~
( ) Pr( ) E( bid bid f t bid P P P P P R - × £ = +
Value traders will recognise their lack of confidence in their forecasts as the risk in submitting orders.
When the expected return is substantially larger than the risk, the trader will place either a selling or
buying order, which has a larger expected return. In our model, this lack of confidence is given as an
expected dispersion (standard deviation) g  of the aggregate of each value trader’s expected values.
31
 
30 Information accessibility or stringent management (whether by brokers or small investors) of trade execution costs can be
considered as determinants of the level of a  and  b , although these factors cannot be observed in the actual market. We
run the simulation by changing the values of these two parameters, and analyse how these parameters affect market
behaviour.
 
31 g  represents each trader’s forecast of the actual dispersion  V s .16
) E( ) E( bid ask P R P R >  and  A
P R ask > g
) E(   then  Selling limit order ( ask P )
) E( ) E( bid ask P R P R <  and  A P R bid > g
) E(
  then  Buying limit order ( bid P )
where  A is a positive constant reflecting a trader’s risk aversion.
4.2.3 Trading behaviour of momentum traders
Momentum traders are indifferent to the level of market prices and their trading is based on the trends
and volatility of market prices. Namely, based on the short-term forecast by taking into account
historical market data, they compare the expected earnings ratio with risks until the next trading
opportunity, and, if the extent of their risk aversion allows, make selling market orders (when market
prices are falling), or buying market orders (when market prices are rising). The order of the
momentum trader is:
B h h - <
’ ’ /s m then  Selling market order
B h h >
’ ’ /s m then Buying market order
where  h m¢  and  h s¢  are obtained from formulas (1) and (2) of Section 4.2.1, and B is a positive
constant which reflects a trader’s risk aversion.
5. Results of analysis
5.1 Basic design of simulation
Now we introduce the standard case of our simulation. We will set the parameters as follows:







10 : traders momentum
50 : traders value
·  Market access frequency of the traders: 1/10
·  Look-back periods of the traders (b): 10
·  Forecasting periods of the traders ( f ): 10
·  Mean of traders’ expected values (P
~
): 1,000 (yen)
·  Standard deviation of expected values ( V s ): 0.05
·  Extent of risk aversion for value traders ( A): 2
·  Extent of risk aversion for momentum traders (B): 2
·  Extent of order imbalance ( n V ) being reflected through trends ( h m ): 0
·  Extent of gross order volume ( g V ) being reflected through volatility ( h s ): 0.
In the following simulations (5.2–5.5), the standard cases are: 10  momentum traders (5.2),
05 . 0 = = g s v  (5.3), both types of traders’ extent of risk aversion = 2 (5.4), and  0 = = b a  (5.5).
Observed indicators are as follows:17
·  Quote existence probability: 35%
·  Trade frequency: 1.86 times per period
·  Execution price volatility: 0.0135
·  Mean price volatility: 0.0131
·  Average spread: 0.0098
·  Average of gross order volume: 43
·  Volatility of gross order volume: 0.49
·  Standard deviation of order imbalance / average of gross order volume: 0.69.
5.2 Composition of traders
As indicated in the previous section, our model uses two types of traders: value traders and momentum
traders. In a market composed of 50 traders, we will analyse the effects of market behaviour when the
number of momentum traders increases.
32 Figure 8 summarises the features of the market data. We can
see by various indicators that liquidity supply decreases as the proportion of value traders declines,
and liquidity absorption increases as the proportion of momentum traders increases.
We can see from Figures 8-1 and 8-2 that since orders on the book diminish as market orders from
momentum traders increase, the number of cases in which quotes disappear would rise (probability of
quote existence falls), while trade frequency would increase. However, there are diminishing, instead
of linear, trends in both effects: when the number of momentum traders increases past a certain level
(30 or 40 in our case), the probability of quote existence no longer falls, and trade frequency no longer
increases. In Figure 8-1, when the number of momentum traders exceeds 30 and the probability of
quote existence falls to a level of around 20%, a phase in which market orders buy up the selling order
book to exhaust the orders, and a phase in which market orders sell down the buying order book to
exhaust the orders, show up one after another. In addition, at the point when one phase shifts to
another, quotes disappear, that is, no trading will be executed: it is unlikely to see further decline in the
probability of quote existence or further increase in trade frequency.
Next, when we see the volatility of execution price and mean quote during the simulation period
(Figures 8-3 and 8-4) on the one hand, the volatility increases in the buying up/selling down process
mentioned above when the number of momentum traders increases to 30. On the other hand, when the
proportion of momentum traders exceeds a certain value, the probability of quote existence reaches its
limit and thus trading becomes difficult to execute, or price is not discovered smoothly; as a result, the
volatility of execution price and mean quote is contained.
Figures 8-5 and 8-6 show the development of two liquidity indicators, average spread and average
gross orders. During the process in which the number of momentum traders increases from zero to 20,
orders on the order book are exhausted as market order increases, thereby spread increases and gross
order book volume decreases. However, there seems to be a lower-limit to the decline in liquidity
accompanied by the increase in the number of momentum traders. When the composition of
momentum traders exceeds a certain level, trade frequency is contained, thus making a further
liquidity decline difficult.
Figure  8-7 displays volatility of gross order book volume. This indicator can be regarded as
representing the ease with which the order book is restored to its original state after a certain decrease
in orders. In essence, it is a proxy for market liquidity resiliency. An increase in the number of
 
32 The momentum traders cannot exceed 50% of the composition because the order book will diminish once momentum
traders become dominant. While value traders generally place limit orders, momentum traders always place market
orders. Thus too many momentum traders would wipe out the limit order book from the market.18
momentum traders will increase the resiliency of market liquidity to some extent, although this
increasing effect will diminish and become constant because of the relative decrease in limit orders.
Finally, Figure 8-8 shows the standard deviation of net order book volumes, which represents the bias
of market supply-demand. When value increases, this suggests that a large supply-demand bias (either
selling book or buying book exists) is more likely to occur; and when the value diminishes, it is more
likely that the market will reach equilibrium. We can observe that when the composition of
momentum traders exceeds a certain ratio, order imbalance is more likely to emerge.
5.3 Dispersion of expectations on future prices and traders’ confidence
Value traders subjectively forecast the fundamental value of their own assets. At the same time, they
assume a variance of the expectation distribution for the asset prices of all market participants. The
variance is inversely proportional to the confidence in their expected value. In other words, the
variance of expectation distribution decreases when traders are confident of their price forecasts, while
variance tends to be large when traders are not so confident of their forecasts. As shown in 4.2, traders
recognise magnitude of variance as a risk in placing orders
Although expected values and the assumed variance of the expectation distribution change
dynamically in an actual market, here we treat them as constant and analyse how the difference
between their sizes affects market behaviour patterns. Figure  9 shows the development of each
indicator when market participants’ expected variance and true variance, respectively, are changed.
First we first look at the changes in the probability of quote existence and trade frequency (Figures 9-1
and 9-2). When the expected variance equals the true variance, namely on the 45 degree line (plain),
both indicators move almost at constant levels (probability of quote existence=0.3, trade
frequency=1.8). When the expected variance is less than the true variance, namely below the
45-degree plane, both indicators increase as the difference between expected and true variance
increases (moves toward the other side of the plane). On the other hand, when the expected variance is
larger than the true variance, namely above the 45-degree plane, both indicators decrease as the
difference between expected and true variance increases (moves toward this side of the plane). This
can be interpreted to mean that: when market participants underestimate actual risks in the market,
trading becomes more active than when risk is correctly estimated; while when risks are
overestimated, trading rapidly diminishes.
Second, we look at changes in the volatility of execution price and mean value (Figures 9-3 and 9-4).
The slope along the horizontal axis (expected variance) is almost flat regardless of the value of the true
variance (which is depicted on the axis heading toward the back), while showing acclivity toward the
back regardless of the values of expected variance. This suggests volatility falls as true variance
declines. This implies the possibility that the magnitude of expected variance does not affect the price
discovery mechanism, and the magnitude of price changes is determined by the actual dispersion of
market participants’ expectations.
A similar feature can be pointed out for the development of average spread (Figure 9-5). The slope
toward the direction of the horizontal axis is flat regardless of the level of the true variance, while
showing acclivity toward the back regardless of the magnitude of the expected variance. This implies
the possibility that market liquidity measured by the average spread has been affected by the true
variance instead of the expected variance, and that market liquidity declines as true variance increases.
Figures 9-6 and 9-7 focused on the gross order book volume as an indicator of the depth of market
liquidity. We can see that, as in the case of the probability of quote existence and trade frequency, the
line of the story changes at the border of the 45-degree plane, where the expected variance equals the
true variance. In the space below the 45-degree plane, where the true variance is larger than the
expected variance, the gross volume of the order book increases as the difference between expected
and true variance increases (moves toward the other side of the plane), while the volatility of the gross
volume of the order book is almost constant. On the other hand, in the space above the 45-degree
plane, where the expected variance is larger than the true variance, both the gross volume of the order
book and its volatility decline as the difference between the expected variance and the true variance19
(moving toward this side of the plane) rapidly declines. This seems to imply the existence of a
mechanism in which the depth of market liquidity increases when market participants underestimate
the risk, while it declines rapidly along with resiliency when the risks are overestimated.
5.4 Extent of the traders’ risk aversion
Figure 10 shows how the extent of traders’ risk aversion affects market conditions. Regardless of the
extent of the momentum traders’ risk aversion, when the extent of value traders’ risk aversion falls
(towards the back of the Figure), liquidity indicators such as the probability of quote existence, trade
frequency, and order book profile (average  g V ) (Figures 10-1, 10-2 and 10-6) rise, while price
volatility  (Figures 10-3  and  10-4)  increases  as  the  extent  of  the  value traders’  risk  aversion  rises
(toward the back of the Figure). The average spread (Figure 10-5) is not likely to be affected too much
by the extent of risk aversion. Regarding market resiliency (Figure 10-7) and order imbalance
(Figure 10-8), they both increase as the extent of the value traders’ risk aversion rises, while they tend
to decrease once the risk aversion exceeds a certain magnitude (3 in this case).
5.5 Sensitivity to order book information
In the TSE, member securities firms can monitor the order book through their private computer
systems. The profile and size of the order book represent the imbalance of the orders or the magnitude
of market impact, and can be interpreted as pressure (upward/downward) on future prices or volatility,
which is the so-called liquidity risk or liquidity cost. Various ways to quantify such liquidity risk have
been proposed, although no consensus has yet been formed. By using the simple model shown in 4.2,
we will conduct a simulation which incorporates this market liquidity effect. In other words, the trader
will forecast small (large) future price volatility if the gross order volume in the order-book is large
(small), and a rise (fall) in future prices if the order volume is positive (negative). Market behaviour
obtained by changing traders’ sensitivity to market liquidity indicators, namely a  and b , is shown in
Figure 11.
We can see that as sensitivity against order book information increases, the probability of quote
existence and gross volume of the order book (average  g V ) increases to as much as three times as
before, and the order imbalance (Figure  11-8) substantially diminishes, suggesting an overall
improvement in market liquidity. However, when viewed from indicators such as trade frequency,
average spread, and market resiliency, market liquidity tends to decline as traders’ sensitivity to order
book information increases (Figures 11-2, 11-5, and 11-7).
6. Conclusions and further issues
Earlier part in this paper (Section 2), we defined ‘market liquidity,’ a concept widely recognised
among market participants without explicit definition, and summarised its formation mechanism. In
the latter part of this paper, we constructed an artificial market model consisting of hypothetical
traders, characterised by various endogenous variables, such as the expected values and the extent of
risk aversion, and a hypothetical execution system which matches orders from the traders, and
conducted analyses based on a Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, by giving constant values to
traders’ expected values, confidence in their forecasts, and the extent of risk aversion, we observed the
relationship between the size of such constant values and market behaviour.
The results of the simulations can be summarised as follows:
·  Effects of trading methods: If the proportion of traders who submit market orders based on
short-term market price movements increases, market liquidity tends to decline.20
·  Effects of market participants’ confidence: If traders underestimate risk, trade becomes more
active than when risks are correctly recognised, and market depth increases; on the other
hand, if traders overestimate risk, trade rapidly becomes difficult, and market depth and
market resiliency decline. However, market liquidity, indicated by price indicators such as
price volatility and bid-ask spread, is determined by the actual dispersion of traders’
expectations regardless of the traders’ subjective confidence.
·  Effects of the extent of traders’ risk aversion: market liquidity increases and price becomes
less volatile as the degree of traders’ risk-aversion declines.
·  Effects of traders’ sensitivity to order volume information: As sensitivity rises, probability of
quote existence rises, gross order book volume increases, and supply-demand imbalance
widens, suggesting improvements in market liquidity indicators such as trade frequency,
average spread, and market resiliency, tend to decline.
The results drawn in this paper from the simulation approach will differ depending on the structure of
the model or initial conditions, and thus cannot be directly applicable to the actual market. However,
by continuing our efforts to analyse, both conceptually and empirically, the relationship between
market participants’ endogenous, invisible variables, such as confidence and the extent of risk
aversion, and changing patterns of market behaviour, we may be able to collect more insights into
market dynamics.
The following issues require further research:
·  We need to obtain deeper insights into how market participants’ decision-making is affected
by feedback from market information on price and volume. By incorporating the feedback
effects from market data (visible variables) to traders’ behaviour (invisible variables), we
could replicate market dynamics more realistically.
33
·  We need to increase the sophistication of the model by incorporating some additional market
structures into it. Specifically, by comparing the simulation results using the artificial market
model and the results of the empirical analysis, based on high-frequency data, we could
make the trader’s behaviour model more realistic, for example, closer to that of stock market
participants on the TSE.
·  In addition to the TSE type market, which employs a continuous auction system, the
simulation approach used in our analysis also applies to a market with market makers, or to
markets in which various execution systems co-exist. Structural factors such as tick-size, or
the extent of information disclosure can also be incorporated into the model. In the future,
we hope to quantitatively analyse the effects of these various market structures on market.
33 Muranaga and Shimizu (1999) demonstrate two simple types of feedback mechanisms using the model shown in this
paper and analyse market crash and evaporation of market liquidity.21
Figure 8. Effects of the composition of traders
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Figure 9. Effects of dispersion of expectations on future prices and traders’ confidence





















































































































































































































































































































Figure 10. Effects of the extent of traders’ risk aversion
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Figure 11. Effects of sensitivity to order book information
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Appendix
Dynamic measurements of market liquidity
A.1 Market impact
Market impact (l ) provides information about the ability of the market to absorb trades as changes in
price upon trade execution. l  is an indicator which shows to what extent the bid-ask spread will be
widened upon execution of a trade.
34 l  includes two pieces of information: the volume of trade orders
in a certain price range (gross order volume) and whether there are orders in each price range (price
continuity or order book-profile). For the purpose of statistical analyses, we calculate l  standardised
by gross order volume, which is denoted by l . l  will provide information about the order book-
profile which is independent of gross order volume (Figure A-1 shows how to measure). This indicator
would be useful when we conduct a cross-sectional analysis, not an intertemporal analysis, on market
impact. If the availability of current order book information improves, l  (or l ) will be a more useful
measure for forward-looking information of market liquidity.
A.2 Market resiliency
Another dynamic indicator of market liquidity is market resiliency (g ). It provides information about
potential trade needs (effective supply and demand) which are not explicitly placed in the market as an
order. The definition of g  is yet to be fixed, although measuring an indicator which shows how the
market autonomously restores its original state after a trade execution has added to the market may be
a way to measure g . In physics, the restoration speed of a coil, for example, is measured as an
indicator of resiliency.
35  As an analogy, by measuring the widened bid-ask spread caused by trade
executions and the period of time required for the spread to be restored the state immediately before
the execution, we can calculate the speed of resiliency, and be able to recognise market resiliency.
This method captures the process of trade needs, which were potential immediately before the trade
execution, to materialise upon trade execution, and enable us to measure market liquidity which takes
into account of potential trade needs. However, we should note that, in an actual market, g  may not be
observable since new market orders, not limit orders which reduce the widened spread, could well be
placed after the bid-ask spread been widened by a trade execution. How to take account of such
market orders mingled during the observation period and bring the concept of market resiliency close
to an observable indicator will be our future task.
34 If information concerning the order book-profile shown in Figure A-1 were available, it could be regarded as the whole
explicit information on market liquidity at a certain point in time.  However, given that such information is not
observable in general, static indicators and l , g (described later), all derived for price information, can be regarded as
proxies which are observable and indirectly represent order book-profile.
35 When assuming  ) cos( t k b x × × =  as movement of a coil, restoration speed dx/dt will be given as a function determined
by coefficient k which stipulates the size of resiliency  kx F - = .26
Figure A-1. Example of market impact (l ) calculation
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Figure A-2. Example of market resiliency (g ) calculation
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